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It is undeniable that, however valuable or otherwise, there is a constant debate in design history about authenticity, originality and the nature of Ǯfirstsǯ. Given 
that my specialism lies in the area of electronic computing, I am frequently asked ǮWhich was the first computer?ǯ This is not a straightforward question to ask, and people are often frustrated by the answer, ǮWell, it depends on how one defines a computer.ǯ Given enough adjectives, such as Ǯgeneral purposeǯ, Ǯprogrammableǯ, or Ǯstored programǯ one can make an argument for almost any of the early 
electronic computers as being the Ǯfirstǯ – just look at any entries on Wikipedia 
for examples of how people manipulate dates and facts to suit their argument. 
 
The basis of this paper is not to debate such claims, but is firstly to discuss the 
context and particular circumstances surrounding the development of the 
electronic computer, which took place during the second world war on both 
sides of the Atlantic at almost exactly the same time but for very different 
military reasons, and secondly to explore the impact that these different contexts 
had on the later presentation of computers to the general public. 
 
Development of ENIAC 
 
By the 1930s, warfare had become increasingly technological, to such an extent 
that the U.S. Army created a Ballistic Research Laboratory at the Aberdeen 
Proving Ground in Maryland. Among its many assignments was calculating 
artillery shell firing tables. For every new ballistics weapon that was developed, 
there was a requirement for associated information to target the weapon in the 
form of a book of firing tables. Without such firing tables, the weapon was 
virtually useless. Each book contained numerous trajectories for that particular 
weapon for different angles of elevation, and distances to target under standard 
conditions, as well as the different corrections that had to be made to any 
particular setting to determine the point of impact under actual conditions, 
taking into account variables such as air density and wind speed. One single 
trajectory took a human computer (the word computer originally referring to an 
individual mathematician) about 12 hours to calculate, and each firing table 
required hundreds of trajectories to be calculated. 
 
In the book Turing’s Cathedral, George Dyson wrote: 
As the US prepared to enter the war, there was a shortage of human 
computers at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, and an auxiliary computing 
section was established at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering at 
the University of Pennsylvania, where human computers could be 
recruited among the student population, augmented as needed from 
neighboring colleges and schools.1 
 
The calculations performed by these human computers were originally 
performed on analogue mechanical calculators, and later by more advanced 
mechanical computers called Differential Analysers – devices which had been in 
development since the mid 19th Century, but which became widely practical with 
a design by the celebrated engineer and inventor Vannevar Bush with Harold 
Locke Hazen between 1928 and 1931 at MIT. Electromechanical differential 
analysers were built at the Ballistic Research Laboratory in Maryland and in the 
basement of the Moore School of Electrical Engineering at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1935, and at the time were the largest mechanical computers 
ever built. 
 
Even with advanced machines, the Armyǯs Ǯhuman computersǯ couldnǯt keep up 
with the mushrooming demand for artillery calculations created by the onset of 
war. The electromechanical differential analyser reduced the time to calculate a 
trajectory down from 12 hours to around ten to 20 minutes, but this still meant 
that it took 750 hours of continuous operation to complete one firing table, 
which even with double shifts and the assistance of the analyser at the Moore 
School of Engineering, meant a full table took around three months to deliver. 
The 200 human computers at Aberdeen Proving ground quickly fell behind, as 
requests for the preparation of new tables were arriving at the rate of six per 
day.2 
 
John Mauchly, a physicist at directly involved in the production of these tables, 
proposed the building of an electronic digital computer to speed up and improve 
the process, based on decimal counting circuits built from vacuum tubes. 
Mauchly conceived and designed the Electronic Numerical Integrator and 
Computer (ENIAC) with significant help from a graduate student, John Presper 
Eckert, who worked out the necessary electrical engineering required. Both men 
worked at the University of Pennsylvania, and the ENIAC was built at the universityǯs Moore School of Electrical Engineering. Despite concerns over the 
feasibility of the project, funds were sourced and the project began in July 1943 
and took just under three years and $500,000 to complete.  
 
The ENIAC contained almost 18,000 vacuum tubes, weighed 30 tons and covered 
a floor area of around 65 square metres. The concerns over the feasibility of the 
ENAIC were based around the known lifespan and reliability of vacuum tubes, or 
valves. Trying to prevent the valves from breaking down, Eckert and Mauchly 
ran the ENIAC on lower operating voltages which cut the breakages down to only 
two or three times in a week.3 However, with repair times, this meant that the 
computer was still only functioning for 50% of the time. The EN)ACǯs longest 
continuous period in full operation was only five days. 
 
Development of Colossus 
 
The Government Code and Cypher School based at Bletchley Park, 
Buckinghamshire had significant experience in decrypting secret German 
messages, including those sent using the famed Enigma cipher machine. The 
Enigma machine used an ingenious rotor system to scramble each letter of a 
message individually so that even if the same letter were keyed in twice in a row, 
the coded letters produced would be different. The sequence of the letters 
generated was dependent on the initial position of three rotors, enabling billions 
of possible initial positions, and making the code extremely difficult (but not 
impossible) to break. Polish cryptographers developed a mechanical calculator 
(known as a Bombe) that broke the Enigma code as early as 1932, but at that 
point, the initial position of the Enigma machine was only changed every few 
months. With the outbreak of war, the machineǯs settings were changed at least 
once every day, and the Polish machine could not decode the messages quickly 
enough for the information to be of any use. The Poles informed the British in 
July 1939 that they could no longer break the code.4 
 
At Bletchley Park in 1940, the celebrated mathematician Alan Turing developed 
the Polish machine into a much faster electromechanical calculator, which could 
check the thousands of possible variations and successfully decode Enigma 
messages within a few hours. The electromechanical bombes were operated by 
Wrens and ran 24 fours a day, but there was still an increasing backlog of 
unbroken codes. The situation grew worse in 1942, when a higher-level code 
generated by a 10-rotor machine called the Lorenz cipher began to appear, used 
for top-level strategic communications by German U-Boats. The number of 
possible variations of initial settings within the Lorenz cipher was far too great 
for the relay-based Bombe machines to tackle. 
 Bletchley Park mathematician Max Newman ȋTuringǯs tutor at CambridgeȌ asked 
the Telecommunications Research Establishment at Malvern to produce an 
electronic machine to automate the method of finding initial code settings. The 
machine (nicknamed Heath Robinson by its operators), was built at the Post 
Office Research Station at Dollis Hill, London, and used two paper tapes which 
ran at speeds of 1,000 characters per second – one containing potential rotor 
settings and one containing the coded message. The Robinson machine worked 
well enough to prove the concept, but the paper tapes could not easily be kept 
synchronised when running at the speeds necessary to decode a message within 
a reasonable timeframe. The spiked wheels the tape ran on kept breaking the 
paper. Another considerable problem was that the answer produced by the 
Robinson machine depended on an unreliable mechanical counter, and often, the 
answers given for the same message were different. Because of these problems, 
Newman proposed an electronic computer to decipher Lorenz messages, but it 
was deemed unworkable. Because the Robinson machine was made almost 
completely from telephone switching components, Tommy Flowers, an electrical 
engineer at Dollis Hill who had impressed Turing during his work on developing the Bombe, was brought in to look at the problem. (e said Ǯ) very soon came to the conclusion that it would never work. … the paper wouldnǯt stand up to it.ǯ5 
Flowers realised that the problem was similar to one he had addressed before 
the war in designing automatic telephone exchanges. What was required was at 
its most basic level an enormous collection of very fast switches. Flowers knew 
that electronic valves were capable of switching about a thousand times more 
quickly than mechanical relays. He had also discovered that the widely known 
unreliability of valves disappeared as long as they were never turned off. Flowersǯ main contribution was to suggest that one of the synchronised paper 
tapes in the Heath Robinson machine could be replaced by a pattern generated 
electronically by valves, removing the synchronisation problem and enabling 
reliable high-speed operation. 
 
The officials at Bletchley Park were sceptical and would not back the 
development work. But Flowers was so convinced of its potential that he spent 
£1000 of his own money and 10 months designing and building the Colossus 
electronic code breaking computer. It contained 1,500 thermionic valves – more 
than any other electronic device of the time – and was delivered to Bletchley 
Park at the end of 1943. In its first test it successfully decoded a real coded 
message so quickly that a total of 10 improved machines were ordered. The Mk II 
Colossi built in 1944 contained 2,400 valves each and were five times faster.  
 
Postwar Developments 
 
There is a useful argument to be had here about the difference in outcome 
between innovations produced as a result of governmental imperatives, national 
patriotism, funded by the state and with no egos involved or patents to be 
protected, and the development of innovations funded by corporations, backed 
by shareholders and within the strictures of patents and commercial priorities. 
Some have argued6 that all the major significant developments, including space 
exploration and the internet, in recent times have been produced through the 
former route rather than the latter. 
 
Both ENIAC and the Colossus were created as the result of backlogs or 
bottlenecks in the generation of military information: ENIAC to calculate 
ballistics trajectories and Colossus to decipher encrypted enemy messages. They 
were each designed specifically to solve a single given problem, not as general-
purpose computers. The fact that they were designed and built in secret as one-
off experimental machines rather than ever being intended for large scale 
production significantly affected their design and construction, with the 
appearance of the machine, its use or even its understanding by others of no 
concern whatsoever. 
 
Such concerns only emerged with respect to the electronic computer when it 
was first presented to the public immediately following the war. Although the 
ENIAC was not the only large-scale computer in operation at the time, Ǯit 
represents a unique marker in the public consciousness due to the dramatic way in which it was unveiledǯ at a press conference on Valentineǯs Day in 1946. One historian of technology has labelled this launch as ǮThe Press Conference That Shook the Worldǯ, stating that the headlines that resulted from it Ǯwere a major factor in the public perception of computers for decades to comeǯ.7  
 
The ENIAC press conference was considered by the team that developed the 
computer to be of vital importance. Despite massive funding, the machine was 
not completed in time to be of any use in the war itself, not finally being 
completed until November 1945 (in fact, its first real use was for the Cold War, 
being used for calculations required to build the H-Bomb). Many high profile 
scientists (including Vannevar Bush, whose Differential Analysers were used 
prior to ENIAC, and Howard Aiken, the man behind the Harvard Mark 1 – an 
electro-mechanical precursor of ENIAC) were being outspoken about ENIAC 
being a foolish endeavour and a waste of taxpayerǯs money. A high profile, 
dramatic public launch was a way to garner public support for more money to continue research and development on the EN)ACǯs successor, the EDVAC. 
 
In preparing for the press conference, it was decided that the huge technological 
leaps made during the building of ENIAC were, in themselves, not impressive 
enough for public consumption. The team felt that an additional Ǯvisual displayǯ 
of the computing processes being performed was required. Film footage of the 
press launch shows how this was achieved, with the commentary explaining: 
Here we see John Mauchly standing before a wall of blinking lights that 
illuminates as ENIAC comes up with its answers to a calculation. The 
lights themselves, however, had no real purpose, except showmanship…. 
As the engineers 60 years ago prepared for the debut of the new machine, they noticed the EN)ACǯs ͳ8,ͲͲͲ vacuum tubes were not visible on the 
film they were making. So, even when the computer was working to solve 
a computation, there was little sign of anything happening. So they came 
up with an idea. A simplistic, almost humorous idea, but one that came to 
symbolize the very concept of a computer in the minds of the American public…. 
The engineers put large light bulbs on the machine and painted numbers 
on them. Now the film was able to capture the impressive bank of 
blinking lights, populations and changing totals that the new machine 
produced.8 
 
The display of flashing lights certainly had the desired effect. The following 
morning, the event Ǯwas hailed in newspapers all over the U.S. and Europeǯ,9 with 
some of bold headlines even making direct reference to the lights on ENIAC: Blinkinǯ EN)AC a Blinkinǯ Whiz; Electronic Calculator Operating at Penn 
Does Work of 20,000 persons –Philadelphia Record 
Electronic Computer Flashes Answers, May Speed Engineering –New York 
Times10 
 
The ENIAC Press releases generated so much interest that they were soon joined 
by reports of other, earlier computing devices that had been developed in similar 
secret circumstances to support the war effort; among them the Differential 
Analysers developed by Vannevar Bush at MIT and the Mark 1 developed by 
Howard Aiken at Harvard University. Such coverage ensured that the public was repeatedly presented with stories of Ǯman builtǯ, Ǯmagicǯ or Ǯmechanical brainsǯ, which promised huge leaps forward in manǯs ability to solve problems ever more 
quickly.  
 
IBM was quick to respond to the obvious public appetite for anything to do with 
computers. Despite huge interest, the ENIAC could not be seen by the public as 
following the press conference at the Moore School of Engineering it was 
installed at Aberdeen Proving Ground, so the President of IBM, Thomas Watson, 
instructed his engineers to build the biggest and fastest computer they could. 
The resulting computer, the IBM Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator (SSEC), 
was built in only eight months. 
Trying to make sure the SSEC would get as much public attention as the 
ENIAC, Dad had it installed in our showroom on the ground floor of IBM 
headquarters in Manhattan, in full view of the sidewalk. Passersby on 
Fifty-seventh Street could look in the window and watch the SSEC work. It 
was an amazing sight to come upon in the middle of the city – three long 
walls filled with electrical consoles and panels, all studded with dials, 
switches, meters, and little neon indicator lights that flashed whenever 
calculations were going on. Hundreds of people stopped to watch it every day, and for years it was the image that popped into peopleǯs minds when they heard the word Ǯcomputer.ǯ11  
 
The amount of publicity IBM received from putting a large computer on such 
public display was enormous. Newspapers widely reproduced an airbrushed 
image of the SSEC following the presentation ceremony on January 28, 1948, and the exposure of the machine Ǯdid a great deal to enhance )BMǯs reputation as a 
leader in computer technologyǯ12  
 
In the UK, the development of computing technology embodied in Colossus was 
largely uncapitalized upon because of the Official Secrets Act. At the end of the 
war, Flowers was ordered to burn all plans and the Colossi themselves were 
dismantled, Ǯas was all hint that the worldǯs first programmable electronic computer had ever existedǯ13 (apart, that is, from two of the machines, which are 
rumoured to have ended up at the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) in Cheltenham. The Colossus did, however, indirectly lead to other 
projects: Alan Turing worked at the National Physical Laboratory in 1945 where 
he worked on the Pilot ACE, and later at Manchester University, where the Small Scale Experimental machine ȋor ǮManchester Babyǯ), was constructed in 1948. 
This was developed into the Manchester Mark 1, and in turn, into the first 
commercial computer, the Ferranti Mark 1. The Ferranti computer was first 
widely presented to the public in a modified form at the Festival of Britain in 
1951 as ǮNimrodǯ: a computer against which the public could play an electronic version of the old strategy game ǮNimǯ. As with the EN)AC, Nimrod employed a 
series of flashing lights as a display to communicate the past moves, current 
stage of the game, and the process by which the computer was calculating its 
next move – again, giving an illusion of contemplative machine intelligence. 
 
In the US, after refusing to give patent rights to University of Pennysylvania, 
Eckert and Mauchly set up on their own and developed the UNIVAC (Universal 
Automatic Computer). A key technological development at this point was the 
addition of memory drives using magnetic tapes. Rather than being hidden away, 
these were presented prominently, behind curved glass covers. Reportedly, 
observers commented that the sight of the reels moving back and forwards as 
the computer searched for stored pieces of data gave the impression that the machine was Ǯthinkingǯ and furthered the idea of the computer as a Ǯmechanical brainǯ. Their round shape also found a role in the anthropomorphication of the computer as they were consistently depicted as the Ǯeyesǯ of hybrid 
computer/robot machines. The UNIVAC became widely seen as a prescient 
technological intelligence when it was used on national television during the US 
presidential elections in 1952, when in contrast to expert political opinion that 
anticipated a dead heat, it correctly predicted a landslide victory in favour of 
Eisenhower.14 
 
The precedent set by IBM with their showroom display inspired other 
corporations when computers first became commercial products in the early 
1950s. Understandably, companies were keen to promote the fact that they had 
invested so heavily in expensive computer systems and were at the technological 
cutting edge of business practice. They had strong reasons for displaying their 
computer systems to clients and customers, which left them with a dilemma. 
Early mainframe computer systems were highly temperamental and required an 
amount of isolation to provide constant temperature, humidity and a secure 
power supply, as well as to limit access to the computer to authorised personnel. These criteria led to the development of the Ǯglass houseǯ – a glass walled, secure 
area where both the environment and access could be controlled while 
simultaneously allowing the computer system to be seen by visitors.15 The Ǯglass houseǯ computer room become such a widespread phenomenon that it not only 
spawned a whole series of subsidiary industries, but also computer 
manufacturers started to take the fact that their systems would be on public 
display into account in their physical design. The introduction of colour was one 
aspect, with early systems having components in different colours so that 
accompanying brochures could explain easily to visitors what each part did, and 
with different colour schemes eventually becoming part of different corporationsǯ brand identities. There are also examples showing that the 
superfluous flashing lights that became associated with electronic computation 
after the ENIAC press conference were employed for many years to come to 
impress viewers:  
As the one time World Head Of Design at IBM, Tom Hardy, relates, the fact 
that while the majority of the myriad rapidly flashing lights on the console 
of the IBM System 370, for example, Ǯcould provide some basic indications 
to operators and service personnel, they mostly served as a dynamic ǲlight showǳ that visually expressed a complex system processing large amounts of data at a rapid paceǯ16 
 
Conclusions 
 
Prior to the development of the electronic computer, the publicǯs exposure to 
calculating technology was limited to mechanical mathematical devices, which in 
principle were little different to those proposed by Charles Babbage in the mid 
19th Century. No matter how limited the mathematical understanding of the 
viewer, these at least presented a physical display of cogs, pinions, levers and 
counters moving as evidence of the calculating process taking place. Even later 
developments such as electro-mechanical computers consisted of electrical relay 
switches which provided observers with hundreds of bouncing contacts accompanied by a clicking sound like Ǯa roomful of ladies knittingǯ. With the 
application of electronic valves to act as extremely fast switches, the physicality 
of the computing process itself disappeared. The press conference of the ENIAC 
solved the problem with the application of a technical unnecessary display of 
lights, which became associated with electronic computers thereafter. The lights 
represented an intangible aspect of computing technology, which many interpreted as evidence of the machine Ǯthinkingǯ, and furthered the 
interpretation of electronic computers as artificial intelligences. It was an aspect 
of electronic computers that was readily picked up and even exaggerated in 
media representations of computers in mainstream films such as Desk Set 
(1957), Billion Dollar Brain (1967) and especially 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). 
 
I would argue that such media representations directly influenced the publicǯs 
expectation of the capability of electronic computers. In terms of the Social 
Construction of Technology this is important, as once a set of expectations is 
present in the minds of a relevant social group, it becomes a deciding factor in 
the acceptance of various forms of computers and therefore a driving force in the 
actual technological development of computers themselves. Once the idea of 
artificial intelligence represented by flashing lights became embedded in the 
public psyche, it became a difficult notion to remove, and arguably the 
inevitability of artificial intelligence became an expectation of the future of 
computing technology. 
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